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In Between Democracy and Secularism:
The Case of Turkish Civil Society
SALIM CEVIK* & HAKKI TAS**
*Bilkent University, Turkey
**Ipek University, Turkey
ABSTRACT Since 2011, the Arab uprisings, signaling a new wave of political mobilization, have
restored belief in the potential for civil society to make democratic openings. Nevertheless, the
academic literature up to the present has attributed the enduring authoritarianism in the Middle
East region to the weakness or dominantly Islamist nature of civil society and promoted the
development of secular platforms. This article argues that the discussion about civil society is
misplaced, and the democratic potential of civil society is not related to its being Islamic or
secular, but rather to its attachment to the state. For this purpose, it examines the emergence of a
secularist civil societal current in Turkey with special focus on one of its major manifestations, the
Republic Rallies in 2007.
KEY WORDS: AKP; civil society; democratization; EU-accession; Kemalism; Republic Rallies
secularism; state ideology; Turkish nationalism; Turkey; anti-Westernism
In twenty-first century Turkey, the catch phrase, ‘We do not need democracy, but the
Republic,’1 has been utilized heavily in secularist2 circles by those who feel threatened by
the liberal reforms undertaken on the path to Turkey’s accession to the European Union.3
The secularist establishment, the forerunner of Westernization, now fears that further
democratization will erode the unitary secular character of the regime, both by granting
q 2013 Editors of Middle East Critique
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Turan Güneş Bulvari 98-3, Ankara, Turkey. Email: hakkitas@altinkoza.edu.tr
1 N. Akman (2005) Emekli General Nejat Eslen: Demokrasi, Türkiye’nin öncelikli meselesi değil [Retired
General Nejat Eslen: Democracy is not a priority for Turkey], Zaman, July 18, 2005; and M. Akyol (2005)
Ulusalcılarımızın Çıkarları [The interests of our nationalists], Radikal, September 30, 2005.
2 Secularism has different implications and conceptualization in different contexts. The dominant interpretation
of secularism in Turkey is ‘assertive secularism’ which aims to end the public role of religion. Throughout our
discussion of Turkish secularists, we refer to this dominant version of secularism and to the groups that adhere
to assertive secularism. For a thorough discussion of Turkish secularism in comparison with the secularism in
the United States and France, see A. Kuru (2009) Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United
States, France and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
3 H. Altınay & K. Nicolaidis (2008) Why the European Union strengthens Turkish secularism, Open
Democracy, August 3, 2008. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-european-union-and-tur
key-strengthening-secularism, accessed January 5, 2009.
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more rights to ethnic and religious minorities and by clearing the path for political Islam.
Manifestations of this fear and reactions to it range from anti-EU conferences to civil
societal demonstrations calling for the army to topple the government.4
Turkey’s recent paradox framed as ‘secularism versus democracy’ is an illuminating
case for the broader Middle East region, where the promotion of a secular civil society is
taken as a sine qua non for democratization.5 As a Muslim-majority country, Turkey’s
relative success with democracy mostly has been attributed to its secular character and
celebrated as an exemplary model for the region.6 However, it is now the Turkish
secularists themselves who have troubles in reconciling democracy and secularism.
In examining the case of Turkish civil society, this article examines the validity of the
correlation between secularism and democracy. Since its early formulation, civil society
has come to represent different meanings. For example, Edward Shils points that, despite
the varying and changing meanings of the concept, three central characteristics have been
sustained since the eighteenth century: ‘The distinction and the independence of society
from the state, the rights of individuals, a constellation of many autonomous economic
units or business firms acting independently of the state and competing with each other.’7
In parallel, we will rely on Ernest Gellner’s definition of civil society as a
set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role
of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless
prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.8
In the case of Turkish civil society, this article aims to reveal the roots of the insistence
on equating secularism and democracy and its repercussions on Turkish democratization,
a project traditionally promoted by the supporters of a secular civil society. In order to
demonstrate the possible tensions between further democratization and Turkish
secularists, we will examine the development of a secularist, anti-Western and pro-
military civil society in contemporary Turkey. The Republic Rallies, which were the first
and most important manifestation of this secularist civil society in 2007, will be taken as a
case study in order to analyze the democratic potentials of these civil society groups.
Throughout the discussion, we will try to demonstrate that the democratic potential of a
civil society is not related to its being Islamic or secular but rather to its detachment from
the state and state ideology.
Civil Society and Secularization in the Middle East
The concept of ‘civil society’ has dominated the democratization literature increasingly
since the 1980s. Many scholars consider a vibrant civil society as one of the prerequisites
4 ‘Ordu Göreve’ DGMlik oluyor [‘Army, Do Your Duty’ brought to the National Security Court], Hürriyet,
November 4, 2003.
5 S. Berman (2003) Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society, Perspectives on Politics, 1(2), pp. 257–272.
6 B. Toprak (2005) Islam and Democracy in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 6(2), pp. 167–186; and S. Lakoff (2004)
The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism, Journal of Democracy, 15(4), pp. 133–139, p. 134.
7 E. Shils (1991) The Virtue of Civil Society, Government and Opposition, 26(1), pp. 3–20, p. 4.
8 E. Gellner (1994) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Enemies (New York: Penguin), p. 5.






























to the consolidation of democracy.9 This concept, which is rooted in eighteenth-century
Western political philosophy, made its greatest success in Eastern Europe, where civil
organizations played a crucial role in the overthrow of the socialist regimes in the region
with international political support. After this surprising achievement, the concept first
was ‘reimported’10 into Western political literature and then was adopted by the rest of the
world as a magic cure for all the ills in regions where oppressive states prevailed, such as
Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
The revival of this concept as the counterpart of the state became the catalyst of a
presumption among some policy-makers and political scientists: If a robust society could
be established, then this would pave the road to the weakening of state coercion and
ultimately to democratization. Establishing or strengthening civil society via the
financing of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became a quick fix for policy
makers and international donors to achieve consolidation of democracy. The
proliferation of NGOs in quantity is considered as the burgeoning of independent
civic activity and perhaps the source of peaceful democratic change, akin to the pro-
democracy movements that emerged in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.11 In this line, civil
society became an important topic on the checklist for democratic transition, and the
blame was put easily on the lack of civil society in the regions that missed the third wave
of democratization.
This early enthusiasm lasted briefly. After the initial excitement was gone, many
scholars started to question the real impact of civil society in these political changes and
claimed that the role attributed to civil society is highly overemphasized.12 ‘After reaching
soaring and unprecedented popularity in the last two decades, the concept of civil society
is currently the object of considerable scrutiny, cynicism, and even disdain.’13 However,
the concept still enjoys an explanatory power when it comes to studies on Middle Eastern
authoritarianism. This emphasis is not likely to wither away, because the recent Arab
Spring once again has focused attention on civil society and on the new organizational
venues that the technological developments made possible. Striking failures of the Middle
East to experience democratic transition in 1991–2010 were linked with the alleged
absence of civil society in the region.14 Moreover, normative assumptions of Islam’s
9 There exists an expansive literature now on the necessity of an active civil society for democratic
consolidation. Some of the most important contributions are from L. Diamond (1994) Rethinking Civil
Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 5(3), pp. 4–17; L. Diamond (1999)
Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press); Gellner,
Conditions of Liberty; J. J. Linz & A. Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press);
R. Putnam (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press); and M. Walzer (1992) The Civil Society Argument, in: C. Mouffe (ed.) Dimensions of
Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community, pp. 89–108 (London: Verso).
10 F. Ibrahim & H. Wedel (1997) Introduction, in: F. Ibrahim & H. Wedel (eds) Ortadoğu’da Sivil Toplumun
Sorunları [Problems of civil society in the Middle East], pp. 11–28 (Istanbul: Iletişim), p. 12.
11 A. Hawthorne (2004) Is Civil Society the Answer?, Carnegie Papers, 44 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace), p. 5.
12 C. Tempest (1997) Myths from Eastern Europe and the Legend of the West, Democratization, 4(1),
pp. 132–44.
13 O. G. Encarnación (2006) Civil Society Reconsidered, Comparative Politics, 38(3), pp. 357–376, p. 357.
14 A. Abootalebi (1998) Civil Society, Democracy and the Middle East, Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 2(3), pp. 46–59. However, for an alternative view, see the articles guest edited by M. Valbjorn &






























incompatibility with civil society dominate the relevant studies. Referring to the origins of
the concept, for instance, Şerif Mardin declares civil society as a Western dream that
would not translate into Islamic terms. According to Mardin, in the Muslim world, society
waits for the ‘just prince’ to initiate reforms and to take control of societal development
rather than mobilizing itself independently.15 In accordance with traditional Orientalism16
that conflates the East with passivism and fatalism, Middle Eastern societies are
understood to be constituted of ‘people . . . [who] as a whole tend to consider life as a
game of chance.’ In this view, ‘one has no alternative but to suffer the inevitable and
basically negative vicissitudes of life.’17
An extensive collaborative project led by Augustus Richard Norton, whose findings first
appeared in a special issue of the Middle East Journal (MEJ),18 and later were published as
an expanded two-volume book,19 challenged the Orientalist postulates and demonstrated
that Middle Eastern societies are indeed quite active, especially given the authoritarian
political settings in which they operate. Norton’s study quickly become the conventional
wisdom in the academic studies of civil society in Middle East.20 This also was paralleled
by an increasing interest of policy-makers and political donors in civil society, ‘as civil
society assistance has constituted the linchpin of international MENA democracy
promotion efforts.’21 However, this early enthusiasm of scholars and policy-makers faded
away as it became glaringly apparent that ‘civil society has not yielded any results in
pushing Arab states towards democratic transitions.’22 Thus, the enduring problem of
democratic failures in the Middle East still stands unexplained, and further complicated
with the emprical findings of Norton’s project.23
Footnote 14 continued
A. Bank in the special issue of Middle East Critique (2010) The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule
Through Lenses of the Past: Revisiting the (first) Era of Post-Democratization, 19(3), pp. 181–319.
15 Ş. Mardin (1995) Civil Society and Islam, in: J. Hall (ed.) Civil Society: History, Theory, Comparison,
pp. 278–300 (Cambridge: Polity Press).
16 Richard Norton rightly argues that this orientalist analysis can be traced back to Karl Wittfogel’s influential
work Oriental Society. Norton states that ‘according to Wittfogel, absence of a civil society to counterbalance
despotic power was a marker of oriental society, and it is this lacuna that lies at the heart of the orientalist
analysis.’ See A. R. Norton (1993) The Future of Civil Society in Middle East, Middle East Journal, 47(2), pp.
205–216, p. 212; and K. Wittfogel (1957) Oriental Despotism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
17 M. Sariolghalam (1997) Prospects for Civil Society in the Middle East: An Analysis of Cultural Impediments,
in: E. Özdalga & S. Persson (eds) Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, pp. 57–73 (Istanbul:
Swedish Research Institute), p. 59.
18 Norton, Future of Civil Society.
19 A. R. Norton (ed.) (1995/1996) Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: Brill Academic).
20 F. Cavatorta (2006) Civil Society, Islamism and Democratization: The Case of Morocco, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 44, pp. 203–222.
21 S. L. Yom (2005) Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 9(4), pp. 14–33, p. 17.
22 Ibid.
23 There is also an extensive and expanding literature that explains the democracy failures as the deliberate result
of Western political involvement in the region. The formation of Middle East Information Project (MERIP) in
1971 has been a stimulus to the emergence of this alternative school of thought. Two academic journals,
Middle East Report, published by MERIP and Middle East Critique, had been the two major avenues for the
flourishing of this critical literature. For a wider and more historical analysis of Western involvement in the
region see also J. Salt (2008) The Unmaking of the Middle East (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).






























The secularist response to this puzzle has been the exclusion of Islamic civil activism
from the definition of civil society.24 For instance, Ernest Gellner, who for long pointed to
the strength of social life in the MuslimWorld,25 considers Islam as one of the ‘enemies of
civil society.’ In this view, traditional Muslim civil formations are samples of segmentary
societies. They are neither voluntary nor libertarian and do not count for civil society.
Moreover, Gellner finds parallels between Islam and Marxism on their monopoly of truth
claims and considers both of them as enemies of civil society. According to Gellner, Islam
still has a normative ideal that manifests itself in the intolerant character of the Islamic
organizations, and Islam’s resistance to secularism prevents the blooming of civil society.
He claims that the Muslim world ‘is marked by the astonishing resilience of its formal
faith, and a merely weak, at best, striving for civil society.’26
Some other scholars view civil society as a neutral category and accept the Islamic
organizations as civil society; however, they question the democratic credentials of such
formations. Richard Norton, whose study ‘led to the demise of the myths on the fatalism of
the Middle Eastern people,’27 relates the prevalance of authoritarianism in the Middle East
to the lack of civility and tolerance in the Islamic context and, thus, Norton claims that
civil society in the Middle East may not necessarily help democratization, though he is
hopeful that ‘civility can be learned.’28 Questions on the democratic potentials of Islamic
civil society organizations became to be questioned even more in the wake of 9/11. In a
widely read article that aims to identify the roots of political failures in the Middle East,
Fareed Zakaria points to the dominance of religious groups in social life and claims that
‘for those who treasure civil society, it is disturbing to see that in Middle East, these
illiberal groups [referring to religious groups] are civil society.’29 Sheri Berman appears
the most explicit voice of this line of argument, claiming that ‘the growing strength of civil
society [in the Arab world] boded ill rather than well. The expansion of civil society is an
incubator of illiberal radicalism.’30 Thus, religious organizations either would be excluded
from the definition of civil society, as Gellner and Mardin did, or they would be claimed to
be either insufficient, useless or even harmful for democratization, as Norton, Zakaria and
Berman did.
The polemic about the role of Islam in Middle Eastern civil society has concrete
implications framed in a paradoxical relation between the development of civil society and
further democratization in the region. Accordingly, as the state liberalizes and leaves space
for civil society organizations, this space is filled by Islamic organizations, which is no
good for eventual democratization. Thus, the public sphere eventually is controlled by
either the repressive state or Islamic civil society; finally leaving no hope that
liberalization will end in democratization. Moreover, once the failure in democratization
24 S. Zubaida (2001) Civil Society, Community, and Democracy in the Middle East, in: S. Kaviraj & S. Khilnani
(eds) Civil Society: History and Possibilities, pp. 232–249 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 239.
25 E. Gellner (1981) Muslim World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
26 Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, p. 14.
27 G. Nonneman (2001) Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: the Middle East
Between Globalisation, Human Agency, and Europe, International Affairs, 77(1), pp. 141–162, p. 143.
28 Norton, Future of Civil Society, p. 214.
29 F. Zakaria (2001) The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, Newsweek, October 15, 2001, pp. 22–40,
p. 34.
30 Berman, Islamism, Revolution, p. 266.






























of the Muslim world is attributed to the Islamic nature of its civil society and to Islam’s
resistance to secularization, the expected consequence of this argumentation would be to
support secular groups and regimes at any cost, as in the case of Fareed Zakaria, who
argues that the ‘autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed’ Arab rulers are ‘still more liberal,
tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them.’31
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a revisionist strand of studies on civil
society activism in the Muslim world. Mostly concentrating on the Arab World, authors
like Amaney Jamal and Francesco Cavatorta, among others, questioned this dominant
narrative that equates secularism with democracy at the civil society level.32 It is also
highly probable that the recent ‘Arab Spring’ will result in an increase of studies within
this line. This article contributes to this revisionist account from a different case study and
tackles the dominant narrative through its stronghold: the Turkish case.
The emphasis on secularism puts Turkey as a control case. The relative success of
Turkish democracy and the myths about Turkey being the single secular state in the
Muslim World seem to support the arguments that secularism—in the literal sense of the
word—is essential for a democratic civil society in the Muslim world. Turkey is
considered to be exceptional in the Middle East as neither the state nor Islamists per se
dominate civil society. This exceptional position led some scholars to the conclusion that
‘the more relevant implication of the Turkish experience is that Islamic beliefs may have
to be overridden’33 in order to achieve democratic consolidation. According to Binnaz
Toprak, the Turkish experience demonstrates that ‘a Muslim nation can establish, sustain
and begin to consolidate a democratic form of government and a liberal conception of
public life as long as its state distinguishes between religion and the public sphere,’ and
Turkey owes its unique position in the Muslim world to the secularization reforms in the
early Republic.34
Nevertheless, the political developments in Turkey since 2002 enable us to revise the
assumed links between civil society, particularism, secularization, and democratization. In
the last decade, Turkish politics witnessed a booming of a very lively and powerful secular
civil society with authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies. The activism of these
secular civil society organizations had reached their peak in 2007, when struggles over
presidential power had led to an increased politicization of the entire society.
The Secularist Civil Society in Turkey: Non-governmental, but Pro-state
Following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
initiated a series of reforms to build a homogeneous nation-state by eliminating ethnic and
31 F. Zakaria (2004) Islam, Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism, Political Science Quarterly, 119(1),
pp. 1–20, p. 2. In contrast, for a provocative thesis claiming that revival of Islam is prone to democratization,
see J. L. Esposito & J. O. Voll (1996) Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press).
32 A. A. Jamal (2007) Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); M. L. Browers (2006) Democracy and Civil Society in Arab
Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press); Cavatorta, Civil
Society, Islamism and Democratization; F. Cavatorta & V. Durac (2011) Civil Society and Democratization in
the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism (New York: Routledge).
33 Lakoff, Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism, p. 134.
34 B. Toprak, Islam and Democracy, p. 169.






























religious differences under the guidance of a state-determined Turkish nationalism. These
reforms, framed as Kemalism, targeted the creation of a new individual compatible with
the Western model of state and society. The secularization process in the early republican
period (1923–38) included not only some political and legal moves, such as the abolition
of the caliphate and the adoption of Western legal codes, but also some alterations in
public life, such as the acceptance of the Western hat and Western styles of clothing, and
the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday.35
Until the transition to multi-party democracy in 1946, the Republican People’s Party
(CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) ruled the country in a ‘party equals state equals
government’ formula. Nevertheless, after the inaugural development of a market economy
and the formation of professional associations in the 1950s, the subsequent two decades
witnessed ‘the civil societal development of syndicalism, leftist political movements, and
the diffusion of printed material.’36 Civil society organizations have proliferated and
become more vocal in the post-1983 period, with the expansion of the export-oriented
market economy, the arrival of private radio and television channels, and globalized
communication networks. Nevertheless, the secularist NGOs with strong Kemalist
identification rather appeared in the 1990s as an ‘autonomous secularist grassroots
movement’37 in response to the rising power of the Islamist-oriented Welfare Party (RP,
Refah Partisi). In the 1994 municipal elections, the RP won most of the major city
administrations and placed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the present Prime Minister of Turkey,
as the first Islamist mayor of Istanbul. Unprecedentedly, secularist groups reacted to the
perceived Islamist threat via circulating the ‘blacklist’ of all businesses providing support
to the RP, publishing new local newspapers, and founding NGOs. As a counter-balance to
the success of the RP’s grassroots organizations, several associations were established,
such as the Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD, Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme
Derneği) and the Modern Writers Association (ÇYD, Çağdaş Yazarlar Derneği). The
word modern (çağdaş) was used synonymously with secular.38 While the ÇYDD founded
‘houses of learning’ in shanty-towns around Istanbul to ground the revived Kemalism in
society,39 the Turkish Women’s Association, with help from the military, launched a
‘Movement for Youth against Fanaticism.’40
The increasing visibility of political Islam led to the revitalization of the official
ideology. The most notable embodiment of this Kemalist enthusiasm was in the 1998
celebration for the seventy-fifth Republic Day anniversary that commemorates the
declaration of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923. Unlike the routine state-
organized celebrations in earlier years, secularist civil society organizations coordinated
unconventional demonstrations and festivals in city squares ‘to make an anti-Islamist
35 B. Toprak (1981) Islam and Political Development (Leiden: E. J. Brill), pp. 36–48.
36 N. Göle (1996) Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey, in: A. R. Norton (ed.) Civil
Society in the Middle East, pp. 17–43 (Leiden: E. J. Brill), p. 35.
37 A. Çınar (2005) Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press), p. 20.
38 Ibid. pp. 19–20.
39 Y. Navaro-Yashin (1998) Uses and Abuses of ‘State and Civil Society’ in Contemporary Turkey, New
Perspectives on Turkey, 18, pp. 1–22, p. 16.
40 M. Howe (1997) Secularists Won First Round Without Bloodshed, But Islamists Expect Victory in 1998
Election, The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 16(4), December 31, 1997, pp. 31–33, p. 31.






























statement.’41 This celebration is important as it followed the 1997 military intervention,
known as the ‘February 28 Process,’ that suppressed a democratically elected Islamist
government and later gave way to the closure of the RP for acting as the ‘focal point of
anti-secularist activities.’42 There was ‘a widespread belief among the secular-urbanities
that the intensity of the Islamic threat may require the suspension of democratic freedoms
and limitation of representative principles and institutions.’43 In this regard, the 1998
celebrations expressed not only a show of force against the ‘Islamist threat’ and ethnic
separatism, but also came to legitimate the military intervention and the secular regime.
They illustrated how the state and the society were fused to each other against the
perceived threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism. On the sites of the
celebrations, ‘it is not easy to empirically distinguish between what was “the state” and
what was “society.”’44
In the official declaration of the National Security Council Meeting of February 28, 1997
that also gave name to the following process, the military justified its intervention into
normal politics by reiterating Turkey’s commitment to full EUmembership and ‘presenting
secularism as “a guarantee not only for the regime but at the same time of democracy.”’45
Accordingly, the military’s long-term project to reshape the Turkish political and social
system was not some sort of deviation from Turkey’s EU project. On the eve of the second
millennium, however, it was not so easy to reconcile the secularist enthusiasmwith the EU-
oriented democratization process. The secularists, the long aspirers of Westernization,
came to show reluctance toward Turkey’s decades’ long-held dream, ie full membership in
the EU.46 Indeed, some liberal secular organizations, such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and
Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD, Türkiye Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği) and
the Economic Development Foundation (İKV, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı), have been among
the most active pressure groups forcing the governments to hasten the EU-related reforms.
Yet, ‘not all business associations are equally enthusiastic’ about the process. The Union of
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB, Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar
Birliği) and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK, Türkiye İşveren
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) are two examples showing a ‘somewhat lukewarm attitude’
toward the EU project,47 while many labor unions, such as Türk-Metal and Türk-İş, are
openly against the accession process.
Ironically, after 2002, the Westernist pro-EU discourse shifted to the ruling
conservative government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve
41 E. ÖÖzyürek (2006)zyürek (2006) Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in
Turkey (Durham: Duke University Press), pp. 125–150.
42 On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council, composed of military and civilian leaders, issued a list of
18 ‘recommendations’ imposed on the government and justified by the need to prevent the assumed
Islamicization and preserve the secular regime. This led not only to the downfall of the coalition government
and the dissolution of the RP, but also to the rearrangement of the parameters of political and social life in line
with secularism.
43 Ü. Cizre & M. Çınar (2003) Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of February 28
Process, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3), pp. 309–332, p. 322.
44 Navaro-Yashin, Uses and Abuses, pp. 19–20.
45 Cizre & Çınar, Turkey 2002, p. 314.
46 Altınay & Nicolaidis, European Union strengthens Turkish secularism.
47 Z. Öniş (2003) Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in
the Post-Helsinki Era, Turkish Studies, 4(1), pp. 9–34, p. 33, fn 21.






























Kalkınma Partisi), an offspring of the Islamist RP. According to the secularists, the EU’s
reform demands in line with the acquis communautaire,48 such as balanced civil–military
relations, rights for ethnic and religious minorities, and strengthening freedom of
expression, will destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey. Moreover,
diminishing the role of the military, the self-assigned guardian of the secular regime, and
further political liberalization can strengthen political Islam, and this eventually could lead
to a shariah-based rather than a European state. Expectedly, the ‘pro-Kemalist’
organizations ‘enforcing the restoration of the existing legal-institutional framework along
the lines of laicism, modern life, national unity, and nationalism’ do not enthusiastically
support all democratization reforms,49 as change in the political structure has threatened
the Kemalist status quo. This polarized context, in which support for EU membership is
identified with adherence to the AKP, even led many of the liberal seculars, let alone the
hard-line secularists, to refrain from giving fully-fledged support to the EU project, as they
used to do until 2002. Pioneers of EUism, like TÜSİAD, started to loosen their fully-
fledged support and stated that Turkey should not jump into the union. They felt the need
to remind members and the public of their commitment to secularism and Turkish
nationalism.50
This cautious stance toward democratization reforms also led some secular elites to
search for alternative paradigms, such as Euroasianism, which offers forming political,
economic, and military alliances with Turkey’s eastern neighbors, Russia and Iran, as well
as with China and the Turkic countries in Central Asia.51 General Tuncer Kılıç, former
Secretary-General of the National Security Council, was the first state elite who openly
expressed this search. Addressing the military academy at a conference in 2002, he
suggested that Turkey should seek new alliances instead of membership in the EU. Five
years later, Kılıç even proposed leaving NATO.52
Different from typical Euro-skepticism in other candidate countries, a secularist
nationalism called ulusalcılık has developed based on fears about the unitary and secular
character of the regime.53 In this calculation, the liberalization reforms as part of the EU
Harmonization process just recalls Sèvres, the treaty proposing the partition of the
Ottoman Empire based on ethnic communities after its defeat in World War I.54 The
treaty, which offered the founding of Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia, was never
put into effect but was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the
unitary existence of the Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, Sèvres turned into a syndrome
48 The acquis are the set of norms and legal provisions that exist among the EU member states and are set as the
membership criteria to be fulfilled by the candidate countries.
49 N. Erdoğan (2000) Kemalist Non-governmental Organizations: Troubled Elites in Defence of a Sacred
Heritage, in: S. Yerasimos, G. Seufert & K. Vorhoff (eds) Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism, pp. 251–
282 (Istanbul: Orient-Institut): 252.
50 TÜSİAD’dan Hükümete Laiklik Uyarısı [TÜSİAD warns the government on secularism], Milliyet, September
21, 2007.
51 E. Akçalı & M. Perinçek (2009) Kemalist Euroasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey,
Geopolitics, 14(3), pp. 550–569, p. 551.
52 S. Özel, S. Yılmaz & A. Akyüz (2009) Re-building a Partnership: Turkish–American Relations for a New
Era—A Turkish Perspective (Istanbul: TÜSİAD), p. 31.
53 B. Taraktaş (2008) A Comparative Approach to Euroscepticism in Turkey and Eastern European Countries,
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 16(2), pp. 249–266.
54 Akçalı & Perinçek, Kemalist Euroasianism, p. 553.






























among secularists who have continued to view Turkey as being in a constant state of
insecurity. The Sevres Syndrome, on the one hand, nurtured isolationist and anti-
Westernist tendencies in the form of the widespread conviction that Turkey is encircled by
enemies trying to divide up the country; on the other hand, it justified the elimination of
any alternative views, such as Kurdish nationalism and political Islam, representing them
as a danger to national security and territorial integrity. In this regard, the Kemalist hard-
liners posit themselves as ‘national forces without uniforms’ determined to save the
country from internal and external enemies, following the ‘national forces in uniforms.’55
Reminiscent of the Associations for the Defense of Rights (Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri)
and the para-military groups called National Forces (Kuvayı Milliye), which launched
Turkey’s Independence War (1919–22), several organizations have been established with
similar names, such as the National Forces Society, the Association for the Defense of
Rights Once More, and the Patriotic Front. Their objective has been to start a war of
independence against the cooperation of the Western imperialists and their collaborators,
i.e. the AKP government.
In addition to the women’s organizations that had appeared in the 1990s, these new
associations now also advocated for a secularist revival. Yet, what makes them civil is
vague. Some of these civil societal organizations could expand and make demonstrations
via the financial support and facilities of the state. This kind of support ranges from state
officials’ appearance in their organizations to financial aid, like former President Necdet
Sezer’s TL100,000 donation to the Association of Atatürkist Thought (ADD, Atatürkçü
Düşünce Derneği).56 Moreover, these organizations mostly are formed or run by former
military officers who maintained their militarist approach, such as Retired Colonel Fikri
Karadağ, the head of the National Forces Society, and Retired Lieutenant General Hasan
Kundakçı, the honorary chair of the Union of Power of Patriotic Forces.57 Nevertheless,
their capacity cannot be compared to that of the Association of Atatürkist Thought (ADD),
run at the time of the rallies by ex-General Şener Eruygur.
The Republic Rallies, initially led by the ADD, and later also pioneered by the ÇYDD,
the Association of Republican Women, and other women-led NGOs, are the most obvious
manifestation of this secularist response to the changing texture of political and social life
in Turkey.58 According to Göle, the rallies were a ‘feminine coup,’ and ‘the main actors
55 Erdoğan, “Kemalist Non-governmental Organizations, p. 267.
56 In an interview she gave to a website in April 2012, Tansel Colasan, current head of ADD, testifies to the
financial and organizational support that ADD received from state organs. For the full interview, see O. Zafer
Ceylan (2012) Tansel Çölaşan: Kılıçdaroğlu’nun Atatürkçülüğünden Emin Değilim [Tansel Çölaşan: I am not
sure about how Kemalist Kılıçdaroğlu is], Son Kulis, April 18. Available at http://www.sonkulis.com/roporta
j/add-baskani-tansel-colasan-sonkulise-konustu-kilicdaroglunun-ataturkculugunden-emin-degilim-h3096.
html, accessed April 24, 2012. Of the YTL113,000 donations collected by ADD in year 2006, YTL100,000
has been provided by the budget of the presidential office. See ADD’nin Resmi Sponsoru Ahmet Necdet Sezer
[ADD’s Official Sponsor Ahmet Necdet Sezer], Zaman, July 13, 2008.
57 As a radical manifestation of the militarist approach, Fikri Karadağ initiated in the oath-taking ceremonies for
the members of the organization to swear that they are ready to kill and be killed: ‘I am of pure Turkish stock
without any Jewish convert in my blood. We can die for this cause, we can be murdered, we can murder . . . for
the sake of making the Turkish nation the lord of the world.” İ. Saymaz (2007) ‘Vatanseverlik’ yarışındaki
örgütler emekli asker dolu [Organizations competing for ‘Patriotism’ are Full of Retired Soldiers], Radikal,
February 17, 2007.
58 Yüzbinler Çağlayan’a aktı [Hundreds of thousands of people streamed to Çağlayan], Hürriyet, April 29, 2007.






























are the female citizens who worry about the shift in the axis of the laic state.’59 These
unprecedentedly massive rallies, organized in April and May 2007 mostly in major
Turkish cities, were protesting the possible victory of the AKP in the presidential elections
to be held in parliament. The women participants believed that the AKP controlling the
government, the parliament and now the presidency would be strong enough to implement
its hidden agenda and bring shariah rule.
Meanwhile, in late April 27, 2007, the General Staff weighed in on the
presidential election process in an extraordinarily harsh statement on its website. Called
an ‘e-memorandum,’ it reminded readers of its position as the defender of the secular state:
‘It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is a party in this debate and is a
staunch defender of secularism. When necessary, it will display its attitudes and actions
very clearly. No one should doubt that.’60 Exactly like the 75th Republic Day celebrations
that legitimated the 1997 intervention of the military, the Republic Rallies seemed to have
approved the military’s statement.61 During the rallies, the then vice-president of ADD,
Nur Serter, declared that
In contrast to the mentality calling the Chief of the General Staff a ‘civil servant’, we
respectfully bow in front of our glorious Turkish army. The Turkish army
proclaimed our voice on April 27, and protected the secular republic and democracy.
We will not let the Turkish army be slandered.’62
Initially, the name of the rallies, ‘the Republic Rallies,’ demonstrated the efforts to unite
people under this pro-secular umbrella, to show the masses in the rallies as the true nation,
and to eliminate any possible opposition to the rallies beforehand. The fact that these
meetings are called ‘Republic Rallies’ shows they are by definition all-inclusive, ie meant
to include the whole nation, thereby assuming the authorial voice of the totality of the
Turkey. This framing of the meetings rules out attempts to criticize or contest them,
because doing so would mean that the Republic and its founding principles are themselves
contested. Accordingly, those who claim to love their Republic are expected to join these
protests and to protect it against its enemies.
The excessive use of the Turkish flag at the meetings is the main symbol of the
demonstrations around which all participants rally and also signifies the same totalizing
nationalist discourse. The flags of political parties were not allowed in the demonstration
areas, the meeting areas or the surrounding apartment buildings, and even the cars passing
by were all decorated with the Turkish flag. Being an uncontestable symbol of the Turkish
nation, the flag also helped to frame the Republic Rallies and the message as uncontestable
59 N. Göle (2007) Sokak ve Cumhuriyet: ‘Nümayişkar’ Feminen Darbe [Street and republic: ‘Pretentious’
feminine coup], Radikal, May 1, 2007.
60 Excerpts of Turkish army statement, Turkish Daily News, April 30, 2007.
61 Türkan Saylan, the then head of ÇYDD, took a more democratic stance and popularized the motto ‘Neither
coup, nor Shariah!,’ but she was not allowed to address the audience in the following rallies. See B. Oran
(2009) Türkan Hoca’nın evi niye arandı? [Why was Professor Türkan’s house investigated?], Radikal 2, May
3, 2009. Nevertheless, Türkan Saylan also approved the military’s e-memorandum. See A. Arman (2007)
Annem ve ben birbirimizin zıddı iki kadındık [We, mom and me, were opposite women], Hürriyet, May 6,
2007.
62 Çağlayan’da bayrak denizi [The sea of flags in Çağlayan], Milliyet, April 29, 2007.






























truths of the Turkish nation. This turns any alternative view into a separatist or reactionary
threat posed to the republic. As a consequence of this asserted monopoly on the definition
of the nation, those who contested the Republic Rallies and criticized similar protest
activities were framed as having taken a stance against efforts to protect and defend the
Republic and its core values, and hence were treated as traitors. Criticism directed at the
Republic Rallies in particular and the secularist nationalists in general were placed in
the same category of separatist or reactionary threats to the Republic, even if they came
from liberal secular circles.
Furthermore, the speeches made and slogans chanted throughout the demonstrations
were presented as reflecting the general will of Turkish society. When pronouncing in the
demonstrations ‘The people will prevail!’ or ‘United Turkey,’63 the participants assumed
themselves to be representing the whole of Turkey. Indeed, the secularist NGOs that
organized the meetings claimed to represent all of Turkey and to speak on behalf of the
whole nation. Carrying anti-AKP banners and pictures of Atatürk, the participants
expressed their determination to defend the country against political Islam. The
participants also generally used a language similar to the slogans used by those who fought
during the Independence War. Carrying anti-government banners and pictures of Atatürk,
the protestors showed their determination ‘to defend’ the country.64 Some protestors
declared that ‘These rallies must continue until there is no longer a threat,’ while others
considered themselves to be ‘the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal’ and marched in the rallies to
‘defend’ his revolution.65
Their defense was against the Islamists inside the country,66 and the Western powers
outside. ‘We don’t want an imam as president . . . Our message is clear: we are telling Gül
not to be a candidate,’ the protestors chanted in the rallies.67 Their reference was to
Abdullah Gül, the second man of the AKP, whom they believed should not be selected for
the presidency because he had an Islamist background and his wife wore a headscarf.
Moreover, crowds chanting ‘Neither EU, nor USA, Fully independent Turkey!’ showed
their dislike of the foreign pressures they perceived as direct interventions into domestic
politics. The Kemalist motto ‘Full Independence!’ in this framing might even refer to
severing external ties with the EU and the United States, as well as suppressing political
Islam and Kurdish nationalism inside the country. These slogans are evidence that the
hard-line secularists are no longer content with the Westernization project and its
consequences. Even though they use democratic forms of opposition, they are quite
cautious about enhancing democratization. The irony is that what they fear is, indeed, what
they do: If they cannot suppress the rise of political Islam, they think the Islamists will
suppress them.
Since 2006, Kemalism has been associated with terrorism for the first time in Turkish
political history. In that year, police revealed that 14 cell-type military gangs had formed
‘to save the country from the threat of an Islamist government and EU imperialism.’ An
63 S. Ranisford (2007) Battle Begins for Turkish Parliament, BBC News, May 15, 2007.
64 Ibid.
65 S. Fraser (2007) Secular Turks Hold Demonstration, The Guardian, May 13, 2007.
66 Although the rallies called for unity to save the Republic, their rhetoric also excluded the Kurdish groups, and
Kurdish identity was totally invisible in the rallies. Slogans like ‘No sub- and supra-identity! Happy is the one
who says I am Turk!’ showed the disapproval with enhancing ethnic minority rights.
67 ‘Cumhurbaşkanı olma’ mitingi [‘Don’t be the president’ meeting], Hürriyet, April 15, 2007.






























investigation into this ultra-nationalist network, called Ergenekon, began in June 2007.
The Ergenekon network differs from earlier formations in both the high profile of the
members and the extent of its activities.68 According to the indictments, the Ergenekon
was led by some senior military commanders, political leaders, and intellectuals who tried
to sow chaos and civil unrest through political murders and by supporting civil societal
protests, including the Republic Rallies and the anti-EU associations mentioned above, so
that the army would intervene in politics to topple the ruling AKP government. Following
the Ergenekon indictments, several other indictments investigating consequent plots
against the Islamist government were presented. According to these indictments, all the
plot attempts rely on the active use of civil society organizations in order to create a
political climate appropriate for a military takeover.69
How could secular Turkish civil society come to oppose further democratization? This
research connects this situation to civil society’s stance toward the state, rather than its
ideological leaning. In the Turkish case, two factors come forward: the pragmatic and the
state-centered approach to democracy and secularism as part of the founding ideology and
status quo.
Priority of Secularism and the State
Democracy never has been a sine qua non for Turkey’s state-centered politics. The secular
establishment promoted democracy as part of the Kemalist Westernization project but did
not hesitate to suspend democracy whenever it was perceived as threatening secularism.
The Free Party (Serbest Fırka) experience in 1930, which was Atatürk’s most important
step toward democracy, illustrates this conditional support. Atatürk realized that the
single-party system became ‘a sign of Turkey’s inferiority in comparison with Europe and
theWest,’ as Western observers often described the Republic as the ‘Turkish dictatorship,’
one that was ‘Western in form but Oriental in fact.’70 Consequently, he invited his friend
Fethi Okyar to found a ‘loyal’ opposition party. Atatürk also ensured that the new party
would be safe as long as it stayed within the secular republican framework. Nevertheless,
Okyar’s Free Party soon appealed to huge segments of the society and was considered as a
platform to show their reaction to the regime. The party meetings, especially the one in
İzmir, turned into violent counter-revolutionary protests. Due to the pressure of the ruling
CHP members and Atatürk’s withdrawal of support, Okyar declared the dissolution of the
Free Party. The de facto one-party rule continued until 1950, when the Democrat Party
(DP—Demokrat Parti) came to office after general elections. Since then, the military has
interrupted Turkish democracy almost every decade whenever it perceived a threat to the
main tenets of the regime.
68 H. Taş, Will Turkey Benefit from Turkey, Le Monde Diplomatique, November 18, 2009. Available at http://
mondediplo.com/blogs/will-turkey-benefit-from-ergenekon, accessed February 7, 2010.
69 For a summary of the indictments, see The Open Source Center Report (2010) Turkey—Guide to Ergenekon,
March 19, 2010; see also the special issue guest-edited by A. Balci & T. Jacoby (2012) The Ergenekon
Counter-Terrorism Investigation in Turkey: Representations and Implications, Middle East Critique, 21(2),
pp. 135–225.
70 W. Weiker (1973) Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath (Leiden:
E. J. Brill), p. 58.






























More provocatively, one may argue that despite its ideological value within the
founding ideology, secularism was not the absolute target for the Turkish state elite, either.
As Nikki Keddie says, ‘secularization in the Middle East is inseparable both from
westernization and from efforts to strengthen the central state.’71 It was instrumental for a
larger aim: Westernization. The Kemalist reforms connected to secularism principally
were aimed at bringing Turkey to the status of the advanced states of the world. Atatürk
envisaged his ultimate goal for the nation as reaching to the level of contemporary
civilization, which was the Western civilization.72 Neither democracy nor secularism was
initiated as a solution to the political conflicts in Turkey, but was part of the imposed
Westernization process. Westernization has also been considered to serve another ultimate
aim: the survival of the state. Westernization was the answer to the default question of the
late Ottoman elite: how to save the state. The nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, having
lost much of its territories and strength, did not hesitate in the Westernization process
instead of other ideological orientations, such as Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism. The
Republican elite, who were Ottoman pashas, tried to westernize the country to maintain
and strengthen the state. In short, secularism and democracy, two norms, which the West
developed after long struggles and due to political and social needs, were introduced in
Turkey by the state and for the state. This explains why both can be interrupted by the state.
The recent uneasiness in secularist circles with the democratization reforms can make
sense only when taking this state tradition into consideration. Democracy can be
suspended whenever a threat occurs to secularism, a pillar of the regime. It is this mentality
behind the secularists’ cri de coeur, such as ‘We do not need democracy, but the republic.’
The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state tradition in
which the ‘transcendental’ nature of the state requires that community and the state take
precedence over their members.73 In this line, modern Turkey maintained a
communitarian approach to citizenship74 that is based on a monolithic conception of
society and denies recognizing any particularities in the name of national solidarity. The
primacy of secularism over democracy signifies the state’s predominance over the
individual and now is being challenged by liberal notions of citizenship.
Secularism as Part of the Founding Ideology
The main merit of civil society is held to be as a balance to state power. Civil society helps
democratization as long as it protects an area of plurality in which the state does not
intrude. This is an inclusive realm of particular interests; however, ideological affinity
with state institutions may convert the democratic potential of civil society organizations.
Yet we are not claiming that civil society organizations that have similar ideological
values to those of state institutions will necessarily harm democratization; rather we would
like to point out that with this ideological affinity, civil society organizations might lose
71 N. R. Keddie (1997) Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global Comparison, New Left Review,
226, pp. 21–40, p. 28.
72 T. Timur (1968) Türk Devrimi—Tarihi Anlamı ve Felsefi Temeli [The Turkish revolution—Its historical
meaning and philosophical background] (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi SBF), p. 96.
73 M. Heper (1985) The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: Eothen Press), pp. 7–8, 16.
74 E. F. Keyman & A. Icduygu (eds) (2005) Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish
Experiences (New York: Routledge).






























their independence vis-à-vis the state. Moreover such ideological proximity might lead
some civil society organizations to perceive themselves as the carriers of the common
good rather than particular interests, and to project civil society as an exclusive realm. This
is the problem of many civil society organizations with secular leanings in Turkey.
Both the critics and defenders of Turkish modernization would agree that it was a top-
down project,75 further radicalized by the tradition of a transcendental state. The radical
reforms taken by the Kemalist establishment were not the result of any popular demands.
Instead, it was an elite-designed transformation of the whole state and society according to
their blueprint of ‘Western modernity.’ Secularism was the central part of this
transformation. Kemalist ‘secularism’ was meant to represent ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’
against alleged Islamic ‘backwardness’ and ‘Oriental barbarism.’76 Thus, from the very
beginning ‘secularism ceased to denote just the separation of state and religion in Turkey
but instead became a virtual creed.’77 This sacred status of secularism is also reflected in
the entrenchment of secularism in the constitution. Among many secular countries all
around the world, Turkey is among the few countries where secularism is a constitutional
principle and, aside from Tunisia, the only Muslim country as such. According to the
second article of the current constitution, secularism is among the three characteristics that
define the Turkish Republic. Moreover secularism is emphasized further by the
irrevocability of the related article of the constitution.
Taking into consideration that secularism from the beginning was a state project and
given its central importance in the ideology of the state, it is not surprising to see that even
a mild questioning of secularism is considered as tantamount to high treason against the
state.78 In this respect, secularists in Turkey show striking similarities with the Islamists in
Iran in their attitude and the language they deployed against their opponents. Following
the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, reformists organized mass protests. During these
demonstrations, reformists were accused not only of being against the dominant
interpretation of Islam by the regime, but also they were accused of being traitors.
Moreover this was not only the discourse of the state organs, but non-official bodies with
the same ideological leaning followed the same language.79 The same mindset and attitude
could be followed easily during the Republic Rallies in Turkey. As we have shown
already, the discourse of defending the nation against inner enemies was the common
sentiment during the Republic Rallies in Turkey. Despite the fact that secularist circles in
Turkey resort to violence less frequently compared with the conservatives in Iran, the
discourse of defending the nation against inner enemies (and the implication that their
adversaries are not only the political opposition but also are actually traitors, thus not
legitimate political actors) was the common sentiment during both the Republic Rallies in
75 For a supportive assessment of Turkish modernization, see B. Lewis (1963) The Emergence of Modern Turkey
(New York: Oxford University Press). For a more recent and critical review, see S. Bozdogan & R. Kasaba
(eds) (1997) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity (Seattle: University of Washington Press).
76 H. Yavuz (2003) Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 46.
77 Ibid. p. 31.
78 Ibid. p. 46.
79 A report on the unrest following the elections in Iran issued by a very powerful NGO called the Isargeran
(Self-sacrifice) Society is very illuminating in this respect. The report is titled ‘Defeat of Velvet Revolution in
Iran,’ and it accuses the protestors in Iran of being infiltrators of Western powers. See The Analysis of the Self
Sacrifice Society of Iran on the Failure of Velvet Revolution, Doğudan, 2(13) (2009), pp. 34–47.






























Turkey and the suppression of the political unrest in Iran after the 2009 elections. The
political language of two completely different groups operating in different settings in the
Middle East demonstrate that it is not Islam or secularism that feeds intolerance, but it is
the association of a political creed with state power and state ideology that feeds
intolerance. In Iran, the incorporation of Islam, as it is interpreted by the state elites, into
the state ideology transforms any questioning of this dominant interpretation into a
security problem; while in Turkey, even a mild questioning of (the dominant interpretation
of) secularism becomes a security issue. Thus, while it is the Islamists in Iran who
associate themselves with the state monopoly of truth, and thus are intolerant of any other
group, in Turkey it is the secularists who associate themselves with the state monopoly of
truth. Similarly, just as the conservatives in Iran identify any challenge against themselves
with treason, so do the secularists in Turkey.
Re-considering Gellner’s claim that Islam, and Marxism he also adds, is unsuitable for a
democratic civil society since it claims the monopoly of truth, we can claim easily that in
the Turkish case, the monopoly of truth lays in the hands of secularists. Based on the
conception of civil society as the realm of particularity, Gellner’s assumption that any
claim on the monopoly of truth will necessarily undermine civil society is correct. What is
wrong in his assumption is equating such a monopoly with religion. In fact, especially in
societies that experience top-down modernization, it is always the state that claims the
monopoly of truth. Thus, it is not secularism or Islam that undermines or threatens civil
society; it is the association with the state ideology that undermines civil society.
Secularists in Turkey who identify themselves with the state ideology and the conservative
Islamists in Iran both challenge the democratic potential of civil society.
Conclusion
Observers of Turkish politics can realize easily the political re-alignments since 2000. As
Ahmet İnsel points out, ‘Turkey is now going through a paradoxical period in which
statist-Westernizing elites are forced to swerve into anti-Western positions, and the West
is defended by Islamic, Kurdish, and other movements of identity politics.’80 In the case of
Turkish civil society, the secularist NGOs have strong pro-state tendencies and they
support unity against particularism. However, two basic features are essential for civil
society to help democratization: The position of civil society as the opposite of the state,
and the particularistic nature of civil society as different groups pursue their own benefits.
Particularism gains importance as a prerequisite of plurality. Organizations that are not
autonomous from the state turn either to corporatist organizations or mechanisms for the
oppressive state to control society. The pro-state youth clubs of the Nasser regime in Egypt
are a good example for this.81 Moreover, those organizations that align themselves with
hegemonic ideologies rather than pursue their particular interests and also claim a
discursive monopoly of truth become less tolerant and not inclined to compromise.
80 A. İnsel (2003) The AKP and the Normalizing of Democracy in Turkey, South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3),
pp. 293–308, p. 306.
81 For an analysis of these youth clubs, see Y. Di-Capua (2004) Sports, Society, and Revolution: Egypt in the
Early Nasserite Period, in: E. Podeh & O. Winckler (eds) Rethinking Nasserism (Gainesville: University Press
of Florida), pp. 144–162.






























We posit that it is not a matter of being secular or Islamic but of plurality versus totality.
Literature in the Western context, following Hegel, accepts the particularistic and egoistic
character of civil society as given, concentrates on the coordination and reconciliation of
the clashes of these particularistic interests and the state. However, in societies witnessing
top-down modernization, fragments of the society, which are foremost modernizers, may
claim the monopoly of the ultimate reason (of the Hegelian state). These groups act in the
name of the common good thus leaving no space for particularization and diversification
of interest. With their monopoly on the ultimate truth, these groups show little tolerance
toward ‘other’ groups in society. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the
discussion on civil society and democratization in the Middle East is misplaced in the
secularism–Islam nexus. Indeed, attention should be focused on the issues of plurality
versus totality. As the Turkish case demonstrates, the totalistic and intolerant character of
civil society in the Middle East does not necessarily stem from its Islamic character. In
fact, the major impediments to democratization are the non-existence of particularity and
the anti-state features of civil society.
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Mardin, Ş. (1995) Civil Society and Islam, in: J. Hall (Ed.) Civil Society: History, Theory, Comparison
(Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 278–300.
Milliyet (2007a) Çağlayan’da bayrak denizi [The sea of flags in Çağlayan], April 29.
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Taraktaş, B. (2008) A Comparative Approach to Euroscepticism in Turkey and Eastern European Countries,
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 16(2), pp. 249–266.
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